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On 3 July 1991, the Russian legislature passed a law that mandated privatiza- 
tion of most  state firms and prescribed  methods for doing so. The work  on 
implementation of this law was slow at first and was interrupted by momentous 
changes in the government in August. Starting from mid-November  1991, the 
new government resumed work on the privatization guidelines. On 27 Decem- 
ber  1991, the Supreme Soviet passed an elaboration of the 3 July law, called 
the “Fundamental  Positions  of  the Privatization Program,” In January  1992, 
this document was supplemented by several decrees signed by Yeltsin, which 
explained  the various steps of the process.  Finally, in late March  1992, the 
government produced the actual privatization program that it offered to Parlia- 
ment  for approval. Since the privatization itself has not really  begun, these 
documents represent the first steps toward privatization in Russia. Our paper 
discusses the state of Russian privatization up to the end of March 1992, in- 
cluding the proposed program. In particular, we focus on one key issue that the 
privatization process confronted: how to reconcile the conflicting claims of the 
de facto “owners” of assets that must be privatized. 
The issue of the initial allocation of  property  rights in state firms, before 
they are privatized, rarely receives attention. In many cases, it simply does not 
arise. For example, in the U.K. privatization, the government clearly owned 
the shares it sold, so there was no question of who was selling the shares, only 
how and to whom. Even in the context of  Eastern Europe, it is often simply 
assumed that the government owns the shares and then has to sell or distribute 
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them to the population. The questions that generate intellectual and practical 
excitement are, first, who should be the eventual owners of  the  shares and, 
second, how to sell or allocate the shares from the government to these even- 
tual owners to  maximize  efficiency? Both  these questions presume that the 
seller of shares is clear, namely, the government. 
Yet, as the experience of Poland illustrates, the workers of the companies do 
not agree that the shares are the government’s to distribute as it wishes. Failure 
to appreciate this point is undoubtedly the most important cause of the delay 
of  privatization  in Poland,  More generally, companies in Eastern  Europe in 
general, and Russia in particular, do not have an unambiguous de facto owner- 
ship structure, in which the government owns the shares. On the contrary, many 
“stakeholders”  have existing ownership rights, in the sense of being able to 
exercise control  rights  over assets effectively.  Moreover,  these  stakeholders 
take both economic and political action to defend their rights. Unless these 
stakeholders  are  appeased, bribed,  or disenfranchised,  privatization  cannot 
proceed. 
In Poland and Hungary, the important stakeholders are the workers and the 
managers. In Russia, they also include the local governments and the branch 
ministries. These stakeholders correctly see privatization as a redistribution of 
property rights rather than as a gift from the government. In this paper we ask 
how the center can reconcile the control claims of these multiple de facto own- 
ers and, in particular, how it can reduce the damage they do while competing 
for the pie? Our answer is to pay off some stakeholders with dividends and 
privatization proceeds so that they give up the control rights that conflict with 
those of others. 
We develop this answer in several steps. Section 12.1 briefly discusses our 
theoretical approach to property rights and privatization. Section 12.2 surveys 
the distribution  of  property  rights  in enterprises  under socialism and shows 
how the relatively  clear distribution of these rights collapses when socialism 
does. The decline of the power of the state and the ministries has created an 
“ownership vacuum” in Russia that was filled by  new effective owners: the 
workers,  the  managers,  and  the  local  governments,  whose  control  rights 
are often in conflict. Section 12.3 looks at spontaneous privatization, which 
is  essentially  a  way  to  cut  out  the  Russian  government  from  its  owner- 
ship claim. Section  12.4 discusses  ways to reconcile  the conflicting claims. 
Section 12.5 examines the likely future of privatization in Russia. Section 12.6 
sums up. 
12.1  The Theoretical Framework 
Coase (1960) has made the profound observation that, once property rights 
over assets are completely  defined between  a set of agents, in most circum- 
stances these agents will negotiate an efficient way to use these assets. Coase 
also argued that many inefficient uses of assets stem from poorly defined prop- 
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poorly defined. He also argued that, so long as property rights are in fact well 
defined, it does not matter exactly how they are delineated. Grossman and Hart 
(1986) showed, in contrast, that the allocation of property rights is not neutral, 
as Coase argued, but matters for the ex ante investments that agents must make 
in human capital complementary  with these assets. Thus, a possibly unique 
efficient allocation of property  rights does indeed exist. Grossman  and Hart 
did not treat the case where property rights are not well defined. 
This paper focuses  on  situations  with  poorly  defined  property  rights.  It 
therefore pays to specify more clearly what that means. When property rights 
are poorly  defined, no agent has unambiguous  control  rights over assets in 
uncontracted for circumstances. There are no clearly defined rules of the game 
about who decides what to do with the asset. As a result, default rules come to 
be used. One such rule is, First come, first served: the agent who gets to the 
asset first gets to use it, at least for a time, as he likes and can exclude all the 
others from using it. Another such rule is that no agent can use the asset, since 
every agent can exclude others from using it; therefore, the asset stands idle. 
Hart and Moore (1990) called this arrangement joint ownership. A variation 
of this rule is that no agent can use the asset in a new way, so some status quo 
other than idleness prevails. A third default rule is that all the agents try to use 
the asset simultaneously  in ways they see fit and cannot exclude others from 
using it. Some Nash equilibrium in agent’s actions obtains in this case. These 
default rules do not typically lead to an efficient use of the assets. Defining 
property rights would replace them by  efficient negotiations, but can this be 
done? 
State firms in Russia, like elsewhere in Eastern Europe, exemplify assets 
with multiple owners with overlapping control rights and no procedures  for 
resolving conflicts. The workers, the managers, the ministries, the local gov- 
ernments, and the central government  all have  some cash-flow  and control 
rights over particular uses of these assets, and in many cases these rights over- 
lap. In this situation, the Coase theorem predicts an inefficient outcome. 
Privatization is a way  to define the property rights between  these various 
claimants so that efficient bargains could subsequently be struck. The means 
of doing so is to bribe the various parties by giving them cash-flow rights when 
they give up some of their control rights that conflict with those of other stake- 
holders. The workers and the local governments, for example, might be given 
payments if they commit not to interfere with layoffs. Thus, local governments 
might be given a share of privatization  proceeds in exchange for abandoning 
their interference with business. Or the workers might be given a percentage 
ownership in exchange for letting the managers  determine employment  and 
wages.  Privatization  is a mutually  acceptable  redistribution  of  both  control 
rights and cash flows between the various claimants. 
Overlapping control rights are very costly to the Russian economy, for, while 
some control rights over assets have been defined informally after central con- 
trol has collapsed, other control rights are still in dispute. Without settling these 
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of  property rights during privatization  gives the stakeholders an incentive to 
take actions that would increase their ownership claims during privatization 
even if  these actions reduce the  siLe of the total pie. These actions include 
signaling and positioning  to  show toughness that would cause the center to 
give the relevant stakeholder a higher ownership claim. For example, workers 
might strike and local governments turn off electricity  supply to the firm to 
show how tough they are. Stakeholder activities that destroy value to enhance 
their ownership rights-perhaps  through a large delay of  privatization-are 
an important cost of ambiguous property rights. 
This paper tries to describe plausible ways to allocate cash flows and control 
rights to reduce some of the costs associated with the current disagreements. 
We first explain, in the context of Russian privatization,who the relevant stake- 
holders are, what decisions they have control over, and what damage they can 
do and have done if their ownership claims are not respected. We then propose 
a way  to allocate cash flows in order to contain,  if not eliminate, the value- 
reducing activities of the unhappy stakeholders. We discuss how to pay off the 
local governments, the managers, and the workers to go along with privatiza- 
tion and restructuring. Importantly, we discuss not optimal schemes but rather 
schemes that can be easily introduced into the law and therefore guide priva- 
tization. 
12.2  Ownership during Socialism and after Its Collapse 
12.2.1  Ownership under Socialism 
Under  socialism, the state supposedly  owns all the means of production, 
including the firms. This notion of ownership, however, is not particularly re- 
vealing. Ownership consists of a claim to residual profits as well as to residual 
control rights  (Grossman  and Hart  1986). The Treasury  has some claim on 
profits or losses of  state firms. But there is no “state” that has control rights. 
These rights instead are shared by the managers of the firm and the bureaucrats 
in the ministry that oversees the firm. The ministry bureaucrats are probably 
the more important owners, in the sense of having most of the power to dictate 
the decisions of the firms. Legally, the ministry bureaucrats have the right to 
choose the top managers, to determine the production  and investment, to set 
prices, to allocate inputs and buy outputs, to determine the general growth rate 
of  wages, and so on. They do not make micro production decisions, but they 
control most of  the other ones. Most rights  of  the ministry bureaucrats  are 
enforced through central control, but they also maintain these rights through 
complete control over the delivery of scarce inputs. 
How  do the  ministry  bureaucrats  translate  these  control  rights  into cash 
flows for themselves? The ministry bureaucrats use their rights to extract sur- 
plus from the firm, subject to attaining some minimal level of profits (or maxi- 
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services from the  firm. Another way  to extract surplus is to underprice the 
supplier’s and the firm’s output. By intentionally making the inputs scarce, the 
bureaucrats can extract bribes from the firm in exchange for deliveries; by mak- 
ing outputs scarce, they can do the same with the firm’s customers. Pervasive 
shortages under socialism result from this profit-maximizing  exercise by the 
bureaucrats of their effective ownership rights (Shleifer and Vishny 1992). 
Under socialism, managers of the firm also have some control rights. They 
have the know-how  and the connections to solve the problems of pervasive 
shortages and breakdowns. This gives them some control over production, in- 
vestment,and employment decisions as well as over most micro decisions of 
firms. Their knowledge also makes them valuable to the bureaucrats and hence 
enables them to collect some of the rents from the firm. 
In contrast, workers  own nothing under socialism-Marx  and Lenin not- 
withstanding. Workers own the firm only to the extent that they have an influ- 
ence over its policies or a claim on its cash flows. In Communist Russia, work- 
ers’ ability to strike and otherwise exercise control rights was severely limited 
by the central government. They certainly had no control over wages or em- 
ployment. Also relatively unimportant were the local governments: any attempt 
by them to exercise control over the firm was certain to invite retribution from 
the center. With full control over local budgets,  the center had local govern- 
ments under its thumb. The relevant owners, then, were first the ministry bu- 
reaucrats and second the managers. 
12.2.2  Ownership during the Transition 
The control rights over the decisions of firms have changed radically in Rus- 
sia since  1988, as socialism and central  control collapsed. Starting in  1988, 
the government implemented a range of reforms that transferred many of the 
decisions over output mix, output level, customer choice, and wages to enter- 
prise managers. The ministries also lost their right to appoint managers, al- 
though it is not clear who gained it (the workers began to have some input). 
The 1988 reforms kept the prices fixed but at the same time allowed firms to 
sell a small portion of their output at free prices. The reforms also kept most 
of the input allocation centralized, thereby letting the ministries keep most of 
their effective control rights. 
Over the  subsequent three  years, the  ability of  the center to enforce the 
planned allocation has collapsed. The Communist party enforced deliveries to 
the state, and that mechanism simply failed. As a result, enterprises refused to 
deliver their products to the state at low prices and instead began selling them 
at market prices to whomever they pleased. What began  as a Chinese-style 
experiment with capitalism on the margin transformed itself into a collapse of 
the  central  allocation  mechanisms.  This  collapse  of  socialist  coordination 
greatly damaged state enterprises and may have led to aggregate output de- 
clines in 1990 and 1991. 
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they could no longer dictate to firms what to do, and, even if they tried, they 
had no law or force to support their orders. More important, when the minis- 
tries lost control over the outputs of  some enterprises, they also lost control 
over firms for which these outputs were inputs. When the ministries could no 
longer  assure  supply  deliveries,  managers  had  to find  inputs, which  often 
meant barter and other market transactions. To the extent that the control rights 
of the ministries depended on supply assurance, these control rights have di- 
minished a great deal. 
The control rights of the ministries have not disappeared completely.  Be- 
cause ministries still have control over some industry assets, such as research 
institutes, information networks, and export licenses, they continue to exercise 
control over firms. Perhaps more important, branch ministers from the old re- 
gime continue to sit on the council of ministers and in fact have more votes in 
the aggregate than do the members of the reform team. They use this power to 
influence the course of  privatization in two main directions. First, they argue 
that many state firms are too vital to be privatized or even to be transferred to 
the jurisdiction of the local governments. The ministries want to keep govern- 
ment control over assets because control brings the ability to extract cash flow 
and services from these firms in the future as well as continuation of ministerial 
jobs. Second, if privatization  is to take place, the ministers want it to take the 
form of  free distribution  of  shares along  vertical  production  chains so that 
firms own shares in their suppliers and customers. The ministers prefer, but do 
not insist, that they actually supervise this allocation of shares. The ostensible 
reason for such privatization is to preserve supply links and to avert the further 
collapse of the economy. It is obvious, however, that preserving the existing 
supply relations through cross-holdings  is largely a way to preserve existing 
industrial structures and ministerial oversight. The ministers thus accept priva- 
tization only if it preserves their control over firms. 
Some of the arguments that the ministers make to slow down privatization 
seem absurd yet are sustained by the political process. In one meeting, the food 
minister argued that yeast factories, while quite small and numerous,  should 
remain under central jurisdiction  lest the politicians in the areas where these 
firms are located force them to refuse to sell the yeast just to blackmail the rest 
of Russia. The minister of publishing demanded that all the publishing houses 
should remain in state hands because “publishing is our ideology” and hence 
cannot be given up either to the private sector or even to the local governments. 
And the construction minister has insisted that all the trucks used in construc- 
tion remain  in state hands because  they are critical to the war mobilization 
effort. Even more radical have been the proposals of the minister of industry, 
who wants to distribute 70 percent of enterprise shares along the vertical pro- 
duction chains. Despite these efforts to stop reforms using both influence over 
firms and votes in the government, the power of the bureaucrats  is nowhere 
near what it used to be. 
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In Russia, this control has reverted to stakeholders who previously had virtu- 
ally no power. These stakeholders include the workers of the firm, the manag- 
ers, and, perhaps most important, the local governments. To understand who 
de facto owns the firms before privatization begins, we must clarify the control 
rights of these stakeholders. 
Consider first the workers. Today, the workers have influence over employ- 
ment, wages, and the choice of managers. After liberalization, the workers got 
a right to negotiate collective bargaining  agreements and to strike. This and 
the influence over the choice of managers gives them control over employment 
and wages. Even where the workers do not select the managers, managers rec- 
ognize that privatization  will in many cases formally allocate voting rights to 
the workers tomorrow. This, of  course, gives the workers many effective con- 
trol rights today. 
In addition to these economic sources of worker power, workers represent a 
substantial number  of  voters, in the Russian as well  as local elections.  The 
democratic political process thus naturally favors the allocation of the control 
rights over the firms’ assets to the workers. An important political formation 
in the Russian Parliament supports workers’ rights. Compared to the regime 
prior to reforms, changes in Russia have led to a large increase in the control 
rights of workers-similar  to although not as dramatic as what has occurred 
in Poland. Workers are beginning to exercise these control rights. They have 
started to strike, particularly in the coal and other natural resource industries, 
demanding not  only higher  wages but also explicit  ownership  rights  to the 
assets with which they are working. In many firms, workers have voted to re- 
place the  managers by  those  who are more  sympathetic.  The extraordinary 
wage explosion in Russia  since 1988, in which most of  the extra profits  of 
enterprises were passed on to the workers in higher wages, is clear evidence of 
the increased power of the workers. The surprising slowness of layoffs in Po- 
land and Czechoslovakia after the reforms is also strong evidence of the control 
rights of workers. East Germany, where the managers and the foreign buyers 
kept the control rights, provides a striking contrast because layoffs have been 
huge. 
Workers are also expressing clear claims on the assets of  the state firms. 
Worker groups have demanded complete ownership of the assets of their firms. 
Larisa Pyasheva, the head of Moscow City privatization, has formally endorsed 
this strategy as rapid and fair. The 3 July privatization law allows for a sale of 
some government shares to workers at a 30 percent discount, but that is clearly 
considered to be insufficient. The initial demands have been much more ex- 
treme. An interesting illustration along these lines is VAZ, the giant automo- 
bile manufacturer that has been negotiating a sale of 33 percent of its shares 
to Fiat for a price between $1 and $2.5 billion. The proceeds from the sale are 
to be invested in upgrading VAZ. In late November 1991, the workers of VAZ 
addressed an open letter to Yeltsin and the prime minister of Italy, demanding 
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sale take place and that some of the revenues from the  sale be allocated to 
them as shareholders. They have also threatened industrial action should their 
demand be rejected. Since the Fiat investment is the best hope for these work- 
ers regardless of whether they own any shares, their demands are a clear illus- 
tration of  the vastly increased control rights of the Russian workers. Interest- 
ingly, as of this writing, the VAZ deal is still up in the air. 
The control rights of managers have also increased tremendously. First, the 
existing law gives  managers  a lot of discretion  over what to produce,  what 
price to charge, and to whom to sell the output. The legal control rights over 
firms are therefore largely theirs. Second, even when the ministries have re- 
tained legal rights, they are no longer obeyed, and hence the control rights by 
default revert to the managers. Managers also have some control rights over 
employment and wages, which conflict with those of the workers on these deci- 
sions. Third, the managers have the network of contacts and the personal rela- 
tionships that are essential for barter and for the procurement of inputs. They 
have thus inherited from the bureaucrats  their  most important control right. 
Like the workers, managers have been trying to use their political influence, 
with the local governments and especially  with Parliament,  to translate the 
effective control into the ownership of cash flows as well. They favor worker- 
management  buyouts  at  low  prices,  where  they  often  get  large  ownership 
stakes in exchange for promising high wages to the workers. They also prefer 
these buyouts to take a partnership  rather than a corporate form, mostly to 
avoid possible control challenges in the future. 
Last but  not  least,  the  local  governments also gained many  new  control 
rights. After the demise of the Communist party and of the central control over 
government  more generally,  the local  governments  have  found tremendous 
room to govern their localities. Because the local governments are typically 
democratically  elected, they have  some legitimacy  as representatives  of  the 
local population. In addition, they have received control over some key local 
assets, such as electricity, water, and other utilities, and can translate this con- 
trol into influence over firms. 
Not surprisingly, the local governments have demanded a share of the reve- 
nues of the enterprises in their areas, particularly in the oil and other natural 
resource rich areas. They have also demanded and received a say over those 
with whom the firms can enter  joint ventures, what they can produce, and what 
they can barter. Many localities went on to demand that large state enterprises 
be made responsible for the procurement of foodstuffs for all the residents in 
their areas. They have also attempted to change firm  policies toward pollution 
and other public goods. Many of the control rights of the ministries have thus 
been transferred to the local governments. 
In the privatization  area, the local governments  have demanded both  the 
right to privatize and the revenues from privatization. Since December 1991, 
the Moscow and the Russian governments have fought over the speed and the 
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the local  governments realize the inability of  the center to  enforce  Russian 
laws. They also make effective threats: to turn off water and electricity at fac- 
tories that do not cooperate. Even more effective are the threats from the repub- 
lics on the Russian territory inhabited by ethnic minorities to declare indepen- 
dence unless they receive control over firms on their territories. But the most 
serious problem is that the local governments often do not want to privatize at 
all. Instead, they want to use prospective privatization as a mechanism to trans- 
fer control over firms from the ministries to themselves so that they can con- 
tinue the upravleniye, or management, on their own. In many cases, the ability 
of the local governments to assure the supplies of goods to their areas, as well 
as power and bribes for themselves, relies on retaining control over firms rather 
than privatizing them. 
The remaining  stakeholder in the Russian firms is the Russian “state,” the 
nominal  owner  of  these  assets. Traditionally,  the state exercised  its control 
rights through the ministries and the Communist party. In light of the decline 
of both, “the state” has no clear residual control rights at all, although it nomi- 
nally has all the residual cash-flow rights. 
Formally, the state is represented  in the privatization process by GKI, the 
State Committee on Property. This committee is supposed to oversee privatiza- 
tion and take care of the state property before it is privatized. While the com- 
mittee is quite small, it is supposed to have regional representatives who do its 
job in various regions.  In  practice,  the  local governments  have already  de- 
manded control over appointing the local representatives of GKI, even though 
GKI is an explicitly federal organization. The functioning of the local GKIs is 
severely  handicapped  by  such intergovernmental  conflicts. This is only one 
example, of course, of the ruinous conflicts between the stakeholders. 
The greatest power of the state comes, as always, from its ability to make 
general laws and enforce them in some cases. This, in fact, is what the priva- 
tization program as written by GKI is. Even so, most realistic privatization 
schemes, including the one that is being introduced in Russia, institutionalize 
the actual fact of nonownership by the center. Luckily, the people running the 
privatization program in Russia accept the decline of the control of the center 
over firms, although they do not want local governments to step in its shoes. 
In summary, the situation in Russia early in 1992 fits nicely into the general 
model of multiple owners with overlapping and conflicting control rights. Un- 
fortunately, the cost of these conflicts is the delay of privatization since a typi- 
cal consequence of disagreement between the stakeholders is inaction. When 
privatizations do occur, they look a lot like theft, as our next section illustrates. 
The immediate objective  of  government  policy, then,  is to compensate the 
stakeholders to reconcile these conflicting claims and so to allow legal priva- 
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12.3  Spontaneous Privatization 
Spontaneous privatization in somc forms began in earnest in Russia in 1988, 
when the state relaxed the close monitoring and direction of enterprises. Ini- 
tially, it took the form of simply diverting the profits from the firm so that the 
government could not capture them. An enterprise manager sets up a parallel 
private firm or a cooperative next to the state firm or even inside it. That private 
firm then buys the output of the state firm at the official controlled price and 
resells it at the market price. The profits are in part kept by the managers, who 
of course are the owners of the private firm, and in part distributed as higher 
wages to the workers. 
The enormous recent growth of cooperatives in Russia largely reflects this 
mechanism  for diversion  of  profits  from the  state  and  their  distribution  as 
wages,  not the private  productive initiatives that  many  Westerners hoped  to 
see. The formation of these private ventures to syphon off profits from the state 
was made possible by lax enforcement of  laws and state orders by  the center 
since output could be sold only on the market if it was not delivered according 
to the plan. The process was speeded up by paying off local authorities, who 
frequently shared in the spoils of theft from the center. Informal reports indi- 
cate that most state enterprises that produced desirable output have engaged in 
at least some form of such profit diversion. Gains for all parties at the expense 
of  the central  government  made spontaneous privatization  very  popular  in 
Russia. 
While the initial spontaneous privatization has focused on the diversion of 
profits, more recently, as the control of the center has deteriorated  further, it 
evolved into the transfer of state assets to private firms and cooperatives. Ini- 
tially, these transactions took the form of leasing, where buildings or machines 
were leased part time from the state firms but were in fact used full time and 
more extensively  than the lease allowed. More recently, the private daughter 
firms  set  up  by  the  managers  have  begun  simply  to buy  “redundant”  as- 
sets from the  state firms at negligible prices, often  using the profits earned 
earlier from leasing. Of course, these assets often turned out to be not redun- 
dant at all but in fact quite essential. In this respect, asset diversion has natu- 
rally followed output diversion. 
This type of spontaneous privatization, initiated by the managers with con- 
sent by the workers in exchange for higher wages, has accelerated sharply in 
199  1. These deals are usually accompanied by purchases of  approval from the 
local governments and sometimes the ministries in Moscow as well. Rumored 
bribes in Moscow average  10 percent of the value of diverted assets and are 
often taken in dollars. Spontaneous privatization thus partially recognizes the 
ownership rights of the ministries and the local governments while transferring 
wealth from the Russian “state,” which cannot monitor these transactions. 
The more complete form of spontaneous privatization, which is beginning 
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value of assets. Book values of most assets in Russia are extremely low relative 
to their market values, a fact that has become even more extreme thanks to the 
rapid recent inflation. In a typical MBO, managers raise some funds from other 
state firms or from commercial  banks that get their capital from state firms, 
add a trivial amount of their own and worker’s money (perhaps R 10,000 alto- 
gether for a R  10 million firm), and buy their firm’s assets at book value. In 
such a deal, managers might own 30 percent of the stock and the workers 70 
percent. In many cases, the assets of the firm include a large amount of liquid 
funds, which are not  typically counted in the calculation of book value. Be- 
cause the book value is so low, and because many of the firm’s assets are not 
even counted, the privatized firm can typically repay the loans within a few 
months, if not immediately. The managers and the workers then end up with 
the assets of the firm in exchange for a close to zero commitment of their own 
funds. These MBOs are virtually never contested, especially if the right local 
and federal  officials are paid off. Moreover, the assets are usually acquired 
through a closed company (tovurischesmo)  that does not have traded shares. 
As a result, once the loan is repaid, the control of the managers-and  to some 
extent the workers-over  the assets of these companies is complete. Until now, 
only a few managers  in Russia have begun to take advantage of this way  to 
privatize, but the practice is likely to grow. 
Spontaneous privatization has many benefits. It gives the managers and the 
workers financial interest in the firm and therefore solves some of the incentive 
problems that state firms cannot overcome. In particular, manager-owners have 
a tremendous personal incentive to find foreign or other partners to help them 
restructure the firm. Spontaneous privatization is extremely rapid, especially 
if the local government officials are bribed to go along, since the managers 
themselves initiate and push forward the transactions. Spontaneous privatiza- 
tion also separates the firm from the state and hence hardens the budget con- 
straint. Last but not least, it respects the ownership claims of all the stakehold- 
ers other than the Russian government or bribes the ones whose control rights 
are diminished to go along. At best, the Russian government gets the extremely 
low book value of assets and no control rights. Of course, the whole point of 
spontaneous privatization is to reduce the Russian government’s claim. 
The low prices and nontransparent deals endanger spontaneous privatization 
because it will become wildly unpopular as soon as some organizers openly 
become very rich. This problem is especially severe in Russia, where the priva- 
tization law explicitly states that firms must be sold through competitive pro- 
cesses, such as auctions. In spontaneous privatizations, in contrast, no competi- 
tion for assets ever takes place. As the experience of Hungary demonstrates, 
popular backlash can derail the whole privatization process, not just spontane- 
ous privatization. In fact, the talk of reversal of the deals of the last two years 
is already quite loud in Russia. For this political reason, spontaneous privatiza- 
tion is dangerous. 
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transactions is typically very large, which might preclude efficient layoffs and 
wage control. Second, these deals typically isolate the managers of a privatized 
firm from all capital market pressures since there are no shareholders or effec- 
tive bankers to monitor them. Of course, product market competition and own- 
ership incentives still provide a lot more incentives than government control. 
Nonetheless, complete entrenchment is too much to give the managers in priva- 
tization. Third, only the better companies are typically involved in spontaneous 
privatization. The real losers that need to be shut down remain in state hands 
and are not restructured. 
In sum, spontaneous privatization represents one way in which the compet- 
ing ownership claims can be reconciled, namely, by a substantial exclusion of 
the nominal owner from privatization. Spontaneous privatization  will remain 
very important in Russia, for, even if this process is somewhat regularized and 
firms are put up for competing offers, potential bidders will usually have to 
make peace with the incumbent management. The smaller firms will eventu- 
ally go to the managers and the workers at very low prices anyhow. The rele- 
vant question, which we address below, is how to make this process more effi- 
cient and sustainable politically. 
12.4  Privatization Strategies 
The previous  section has described  the conflicting ownership  and control 
claims of the stakeholders of Russian companies. For many important deci- 
sions, such as employment, wages, product sales, the appointment of manag- 
ers, and investment,more than one stakeholder wants to influence the decision. 
In many cases, their interests conflict, particularly when decisions concern the 
restructuring  of their companies. In the current  situation, no clear rules for 
resolving these conflicts exist. 
The present status quo has two implications for privatization. First, the usual 
way of resolving disagreements now is to do nothing. Each stakeholder has an 
effective  veto power  over any  changes. In  the context  of  privatization,  this 
means that any proposal is vetoed and privatization  delayed. What makes this 
problem worse is that some stakeholders, such as the local governments and 
many corporate managers, are quite happy with the status quo since it gives 
them enormous control rights. There is little hope for extensive privatization 
until at least some stakeholders get very strong incentives to move away from 
the status quo. 
Second, because the stakeholders have enough effective control to veto any 
changes, no restructuring can take place. That means no layoffs, no wage re- 
straints, no plant closures, and no management changes until a way of resolv- 
ing conflicts between stakeholders is found. The local governments, the work- 
ers, and the managers can always use their political and economic influence to 
stop any changes that do not meet their wishes, and their wishes are inconsis- 149  Privatization in Russia: First Steps 
tent with restructuring. Like privatization, restructuring cannot proceed under 
the current situation. 
To achieve privatization  and restructuring,  the Russian  government  must 
find ways to provide very  strong  incentives for the existing  stakeholders  to 
move to a governance structure that is consistent with fast privatization and 
restructuring.  This objective suggests a two-pronged  strategy, which we dis- 
cuss  in  this  section.  First,  enterprises  should  be  commercialized or corpo- 
ratized so that they are separated from the government and their formal gover- 
nance  structure  becomes  more  clearly  established.  Second,  stakeholders 
should receive strong command and financial incentives, in the form of shares 
and privatization proceeds, both to preserve the assets of the corporations  today 
and to accede to privatization. Some steps in this direction have already entered 
the government’s program; others are still being debated. It makes sense, there- 
fore, to lay out the issues behind this high-pressure approach to privatization. 
12.4.1  Corporatization 
In the last two years, many control rights over the assets of state enterprises 
have been transferred to their managers. In many cases, these managers enjoy 
their new power and independence and are in no rush to privatize. When they 
do consider privatization, it often is spontaneous privatization that completely 
entrenches  them at the helm. In addition, the Russian privatization  program 
transfers the control over the privatization of many enterprises to the local gov- 
ernments. Many of  the local administrators  view  this control as the right to 
manage the state enterprises rather than privatize them. Today, Russia is in the 
grave danger that firms will move toward  local administrative control rather 
than private ownership. 
The first essential step to prevent this tide is mandatory commercialization 
(or corporatization) of all the enterprises. This means that, within six months, 
all large state enterprises should be converted into joint-stock companies with 
publicly traded shares and boards of directors. Initially, all the shares would be 
held by the central government, but, as the privatization process unfolds over 
time, they will be given away or sold to the various stakeholders and investors. 
The board of  directors would initially consist of the representatives of GKI, 
the managers, the representatives of the workers, bankers, and perhaps others 
involved with the corporation. After privatization, it would be elected by share- 
holders as in any private company. The idea is to make the state companies 
resemble private companies from the start. Such mandatory extensive commer- 
cialization has been advocated by Lipton and Sachs (1990) first for Poland and 
more recently for Russia. 
Immediate  corporatization  accomplishes  some of  the goals of  organizing 
corporate governance and resolving conflicts before privatization. To begin, it 
creates boards of directors charged with a fiduciary responsibility to maximize 
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because of directors’ liability, directors will at the least try to prevent the bla- 
tant theft of  assets by the managers. In some cases, directors will even provide 
more stringent checks on the management.  In contrast to spontaneous priva- 
tization,  boards  of  directors  institutionalize  the possibility  of  replacing  the 
managers and thereby prevent complete entrenchment. Second, boards become 
a formal mechanism whereby the relevant stakeholders can exchange informa- 
tion and views. The workers’ representatives will both be informed about the 
affairs of  the companies and have the opportunity to express their positions 
formally.  When  they  can  do that,  they  are less  likely  to resolve  conflicts 
through strikes, Finally, and perhaps most important, boards formalize the fact 
that shareholders-not  the workers or the local governments-own  companies 
and therefore have the formal right to run them. Disputes are resolved by votes 
on the board rather than by  other means. The hope is that this approach will 
also reduce the destructive competition for rents. 
Corporatization also creates tradable shares in the companies and hence out- 
side shareholders. Initially, the shares will be owned by GKI, which will rein- 
force the central government’s ownership claim. As we discuss below, some 
shares will immediately be allocated to the workers and the managers, which 
will clarify their ownership claims as well and provide them with some incen- 
tives to increase the value of the company. Other shares will be sold over time, 
which will create outside shareholders with value-maximizing objectives. Per- 
haps even better, the stage is set for GKI to sell control of some of these compa- 
nies through  a sale of  controlling  blocks  of  shares. By creating a potential 
market in the shares of  state companies, corporatization  moves companies a 
step closer toward privatization. 
Unfortunately,  the  realization  that  corporatization  redistributes  control 
rights has not escaped the managers and the local government officials. Boards 
of directors and outside shareholders are not their idea of  independence. Ini- 
tially, this lobbying has derailed  mandatory  corporatization,  and conversion 
into a joint-stock company was made voluntary. More recently, the government 
realized that giving (or even selling) shares to the workers and to the public as 
a whole cannot proceed  without corporatization.  This pressure to distribute 
shares-rather  than an interest  in governance-has  lead the government to 
include mandatory  corporatization  of  large companies into the privatization 
program. In that program,  all large companies must convert into joint-stock 
companies by September 1992, which means issuing shares as well as appoint- 
ing boards of directors. 
12.4.2  The Workers 
To avoid massive resistance to privatization, the government must pay off 
the workers. It is important not only to give workers stakes in their companies 
to make them feel like owners right away but also to provide them with strong 
incentives to want to see privatization accomplished. At the same time, GKI 
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sistent with efficient  corporate restructuring. The privatization program is a 
significant compromise in that it gives the workers substantial ownership and 
returns from privatization without giving them control. 
Specifically,  the  privatization  program  gives  workers  25  percent of  the 
shares of the state companies for which they work, up to a certain ruble limit 
(approximately R 7,000 in March 1992). Initially, these shares will be nonvo- 
ting and will also pay a fairly high dividend. The idea behind making shares 
nonvoting at the beginning is to prevent worker control before firms are privat- 
ized. The law allows workers to trade shares from the start. The idea is in part 
to enable the workers who want cash to benefit from this transfer immediately 
and in part to limit the eventual voting power of the workers. There remains a 
serious question-still  unaddressed-of  how workers will be given tradable 
shares unless all large firms corporatize immediately. 
The government is still debating the question  of whether workers’  shares 
should ever become voting. The correct answer is yes-for  several reasons. 
First, workers’ shares will become an important part of  the float of publicly 
traded shares in the companies and may help active shareholders accumulate 
large stakes. If the shares are nonvoting, active shareholders will not be inter- 
ested in them.  Second, in countries  with undeveloped  securities regulation, 
nonvoting shares typically sell at large discounts to voting shares, even if the 
nonvoting shares have dividend protection. The reason for this is the large ben- 
efits that those in control can appropriate for themselves. In nonvoting shares 
sell at large discounts, the workers will be extremely disappointed in privatiza- 
tion and either resist it or demand further concessions. 
But perhaps the most important concern about worker ownership is that vo- 
ting shares will enable the workers to get significant representation  or even 
control  of  the board,  which  will  prevent  any restructuring  of  the company. 
Worker representation  on the board will probably be extremely beneficial to 
most Russian companies. The law provides for some worker representation on 
boards during the interim period  before privatization. If such representation 
continues after privatization as well, workers will be better informed about the 
true financial situation of the company and will therefore be more likely to go 
along with the required tough restructuring  steps. Board representation  also 
gives workers a voice, which is a better way for them to be heard than through 
strikes and political action. At least in the near term, most dramatic changes in 
Russian companies will have to be made with the consent of the workers, and 
board representation is the most attractive way of gaining such consent. 
At the same time, complete worker control of boards can prove disastrous 
as workers prevent restructuring from taking place and decapitalize companies. 
But it is hard to believe that, even with 25 percent of the votes, the workers 
will control the board. Some workers, particularly  the poorer and the more 
redundant ones, will probably have sold their shares already. Some of the best 
workers might not even vote for directors who oppose restructuring. And the 
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alternative directors do not want companies to change. In sum, giving workers 
votes and some board representation has a lot of  advantages and few risks. 
For these reasons, workers should have an option to convert their nonvoting 
shares into voting shares as soon as the government gets rid of enough shares. 
For example, when government ownership falls below 50 percent, the workers 
get the conversion option. Giving them this option also has the advantage that 
some workers will choose the dividend advantage of the nonvoting shares and 
will not convert. At the same time, the workers who want to sell their shares 
will convert and sell them at higher prices. In equilibrium, only a few workers 
might actually convert their shares and keep them so as to vote against restruc- 
turing. It might be better to have more worker representatives on the board than 
the workers could actually elect. 
These grants of  shares to the workers give them something regardless  of 
whether privatization  is accomplished. To give workers an extra incentive to 
favor privatization, the law provides them with further benefits. The workers 
get 10 percent of the government’s privatization  proceeds. They also get the 
option to buy 10 percent of  the shares of privatized companies at a 30 percent 
discount to book value, which in most cases is a trivial fraction of  true value. 
Importantly, getting anything out of  these programs requires that the govern- 
ment’s stake fall below 50 percent. One hopes that this will provide enough of 
a privatization  sweetener. The Russian  privatization program thus  gives the 
workers the dual incentives that  are required  to get them  to go along with 
privatization and to pressure other stakeholders to do likewise. 
12.4.3  Local Governments 
In the former Soviet Union, tensions between governments are not restricted 
simply to those between  the former Soviet republics or those between  local 
governments in Russia and the central Russian government. Tensions also exist 
between city and republic (oblust) governments, oblast and central Russian, 
and many other layers. In particular, Russia has several ethnic republics on its 
territory that are laying claim to the property on their territories and threatening 
to declare independence from Russia if these claims are not respected. In this 
section, we use the term local governments generically and focus on their rela- 
tionship with the Russian center. 
The strategy toward local governments should co-opt them into supporting 
privatization and relinquishing their control rights over firms. Given that their 
claims are often as strong as those of  the workers, they will not be cheap to 
convince. At the same time, they should not be given shares, no matter when 
these shares become voting, since this strategy makes them large shareholders 
with a substantial  interest  in active control. While workers’  shares are dis- 
persed, local government shares are concentrated. In many cases, local govern- 
ments would use their ownership rights to derail privatization  and to continue 
managing  the state firms. For this reason, the only feasible  way  to pay  off 
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Fortunately, the Russian privatization  program recognizes this and is in fact 
extremely generous to the local governments. It gives them both a chunk of 
privatization proceeds and a role in privatization, but not shares. 
The program divides firms into those under federal, oblast, and municipal 
jurisdiction.  The exact division is still being negotiated.  One proposal  is to 
classify as federal only firms with more than 50,000 employees, or more than 
R 200 million book value, or otherwise large or strategic, for a total of about 
2,000 enterprises. Municipal  enterprises would  be the ones that sell only to 
highly localized markets, and the rest would be oblast level. In all likelihood, 
pressures from the ministries will expand the list of federal enterprises. 
Having classified firms, the Russian program gives oblasts and municipali- 
ties the responsibility to privatize the enterprises under their respective juris- 
dictions and assigns to the Russian government the right to privatize the federal 
ones. It is not clear who retains ownership in the meantime. Not surprisingly, 
the question of how much management rights the local governments actually 
have has become the most important point of disagreement between them and 
the center. The center wants to keep management to a minimum, while many 
localities are more interested in management than in privatization. 
The law gives local governments several privatization techniques to choose 
from, including  auctions  and competitions.  The latter allow sales based  on 
criteria other than price. The book value is used as the reserve in these auctions 
and competitions. The law also specifies ways of dividing privatization revenue 
between the federal, oblast, and local governments. The principal objective of 
this division is to prevent conflict in the allocation  of firms between  levels, 
which  would  arise  if  the  split of  privatization  revenues  varied  greatly  de- 
pending on who privatized the firm. One important  source of tension in the 
choice of privatization  techniques has been the insistence of some local gov- 
ernments that they be able to exclude nonresidents from participating in auc- 
tions for small firms. This preference is driven mostly by the desire to keep 
auctions thin and so to collect more bribes. While this conflict has not been 
resolved, the center has been caving in to this pressure from local governments. 
Whatever the final outcome, giving the local governments a substantial finan- 
cial incentive to privatize  has been the cornerstone of the Russian privatiza- 
tion program. 
This decentralized approach to privatization has several advantages. First, it 
provides local governments with substantial financial incentives to privatize. It 
also greatly reduces  the burden  on the central government of  finding some 
privatization arrangements for a large number of enterprises. Since the manag- 
ers and the workers are likely to get along with the local governments better 
than they do with the center, they are more likely to find an acceptable solution. 
Last but not least, the transfer of control over privatization of  some firms to the 
local governments eradicates the role of the ministries in these privatizations 
virtually completely. 
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ments may simply refuse to privatize and try instead to keep control over firms. 
After all, the bureaucrats in the local governments get bribes and presents only 
as long as they keep control over firms. In fact, many local governments have 
expressed a clear view that they will privatize sometime in the future but in the 
meantime have to manage the firms for the benefit  of the local populations. 
If privatizations in some areas become successful, even the recalcitrant local 
governments might  see the benefits  of privatization in the regions that have 
moved fast and so feel compelled to follow suit. Competition between regions 
for foreign investment and for domestic funds might also accelerate privatiza- 
tion. Yet probably the strongest pressure toward privatization might be the de- 
sire of the workers and the populations of these areas “to get their cut,” which 
will force many  of  the local governments  to privatize so as to satisfy their 
voters. 
A second problem  with privatization from below is corruption. While the 
coffers of the local governments benefit from privatization, the pockets of  the 
bureaucrats do not. Pushing privatization  down to the local level will create 
tremendous corruption problems, as the local bureaucrats try to get a cut. This 
problem is rendered much worse by the fact that the law allows the local gov- 
ernments to use criteria other than price for privatization. Why not, then, sell 
a firm cheap in exchange for a promise to build a park in the city, or procure 
food for the town, plus a bribe? In fact, it is often in the interest of the local 
governments to choose privatization schemes that commit firms to doing things 
for localities rather than  maximizing  privatization revenue. To some extent, 
this problem is smaller when localities keep a lion’s share of privatization pro- 
ceeds. Even then, the potential for corruption is truly enormous. 
While local control spells corruption everywhere in the world, some steps 
can be taken to reduce this problem. Most important,  nonprice  methods of 
allocating firms should be restricted where possible, and auctions (including 
auctions where each buyer must meet certain terms) should be used instead. 
Auctions reduce corruption relative to more discretionary forms of sale. Sec- 
ond, the government should require the maximum publicity about firms that 
are being privatized. Some transparency will prevent the blowup of the priva- 
tization process as corruption becomes exposed. 
All things considered, putting more pressure on the local governments to 
privatize is highly desirable. Starving the local government budgets by not allo- 
cating funds from the center might provide them with a strong incentive to try 
to raise money, including by means of privatization. In addition, pressure from 
the workers is likely to be extremely important since workers in state enter- 
prises represent many of the voters in the local elections. For this reason as 
well, generosity toward workers in accomplished privatizations is desirable. 
12.4.4  Managers 
Enterprise managers can easily sabotage privatization by refusing to cooper- 
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most  important  to respect.  Most  managers  have  considerable  control  over 
assets now and will retain most of it no matter what form privatization takes. 
The privatization program recognizes  the power  of  the managers by giving 
them the right to choose privatization plans for their companies. The options 
among which they can choose include auctioning off the shares after corporati- 
zation, the sale of a control block to a large investor (through some competitive 
process as well), or a worker-management buyout. If the company is privatized 
through a worker-management  buyout, as most companies undoubtedly  will 
be, the managers will be completely  in charge. But, even if the company is 
privatized through a substantial investment by a foreign or a domestic buyer, 
in almost all cases these buyers will seek the cooperation  of the incumbent 
management  both  to privatize and to run the firm. In  this case as well, the 
control rights of the incumbents will be largely preserved. 
Managerial  control is not as bad as is commonly supposed. The Western 
literature is fixated on the non-value-maximizing conduct of corporate manag- 
ers. Most of that conduct results from having excess cash flows to waste (Jen- 
sen 1986). At least in the near future, free cash flow will not be nearly as large 
a problem for the Russian firms as outright theft. Moreover, even with all its 
imperfections, control by  the managers is much less evil than the control of 
either the workers or the local governments. When the Western literature criti- 
cizes managerial control, the usual comparison is to active governance struc- 
tures, such as large shareholders, banks, or takeovers. The emergence of these 
active governance structures is unlikely in Russia in the near future. Moreover, 
the gains from these structures are much smaller than the gains from replacing 
worker or government control with managerial  control. In short, managerial 
control is not a very severe problem (although it is best to avoid governance 
structures that completely entrench the managers, such as closed companies). 
If  anything, the best prospect  for a rapid restructuring  is a transfer of  most 
control rights to the managers and active outside shareholders, as opposed to 
the workers and the local governments. 
Because the managers have such strong control rights, they are unlikely to 
get shut out from the corporate cash flows, no matter what the public sentiment 
against them is. In worker-management buyouts, they are likely to get nontriv- 
ial ownership stakes. If companies are bought by outsiders, they will get find- 
er’s fees, bonuses,  severance pay,  or ownership  stakes  anyway. In all these 
cases, the managers have a substantial financial interest in the success of priva- 
tization  since, particularly  after prices  are liberalized,  their  ability to profit 
from continued government ownership is not likely to be as great as their abil- 
ity to profit from privatization. 
The greatest danger is that in some companies, particularly the rich ones, 
managers might get enough benefits from their current control that they do not 
want to privatize at all. The oil companies, for example, can now retain enough 
earnings that they can buy all the equipment and expertise they need, without 
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sume tremendous perquisites now, yet risk a substantial loss of control if these 
firms are privatized. At the same time, it is not clear that they can get many 
shares of  such valuable companies in the case of  privatization.  As a result, 
these managers might simply prefer the combination of  state ownership and 
substantial earnings retention. 
To provide further incentives to privatize, the government can enhance the 
managerial ownership of cash flows through stock options and other means to 
make  it  more  politically  acceptable.  In  fact,  some  companies  have  begun 
to institute small management-ownership  schemes. Unfortunately, compared 
to what the managers can get for themselves from spontaneous privatization 
or management buyouts at ludicrously low prices, these schemes offer them 
fairly little. It is much better to be more generous to the managers in legal and 
open privatizations than to face the consequences of a mass spontaneous priva- 
tization. 
12.4.5  Branch Ministries 
The one stakeholder whom the Russian government probably should fight 
rather than appease is the branch ministries. The workers, the managers, and 
the local governments seem to be united in trying to diminish ministerial con- 
trol since it directly conflicts with their rights. Moreover, from the long-run- 
efficiency viewpoint, any control by the ministries is bad for the simple reason 
that the ministries are a substitute for market transactions and giving them a 
role would reduce the role of the market. In particular, privatization is strictly 
against the interests of the ministries. If the ministries get control rights, they 
would use them, not to facilitate transactions,  but rather to entrench them- 
selves. 
Of course, as we have already mentioned, the ministries still have some con- 
trol over enterprises and voting power in the government. Excluding them from 
the privatization process will be costly. The current privatization  recognizes 
this and concedes to the ministries in two important respects. First, they will 
be able to review and perhaps reject privatization plans for large federal enter- 
prises. Second, some of the shares will be distributed along the vertical produc- 
tion chain, as the ministries like. So far, the government has resisted giving a 
large role in its privatization program to sectoral privatization plans that will 
be developed by  the ministries. Resisting the sectoral ministries on this and 
other issues might well be worth the fight, for the ministries have no real inter- 
est in long-run decentralization and efficiency. 
12.4.6  The Public 
One important stakeholder whom we have not discussed so far is the public, 
which includes several important categories of people who do not benefit from 
the free handouts or subsidized sales of shares. The public includes pensioners, 
students, invalids, and others citizens supported directly by  the state budget. 
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work at firms that will be privatized. Perhaps most important, the public in- 
cludes the army, which is very hungry and very angry. All these members of 
the public have some political power and want to benefit from privatization like 
everyone else. They are represented in Parliament, are ready to demonstrate in 
the streets, and, in the case of  the military, offer a potentially  much greater 
threat to the government. Like every other privatizing country, Russia must 
give something to the public for privatization to succeed. 
The privatization  program  incorporates  a voucher  scheme similar to that 
used in Czechoslovakia. In this scheme, members of the public will be given 
individual vouchers that will give them claims to shares of privatizing compa- 
nies. Individuals will be able to sell these vouchers for cash, to turn them over 
to mutual funds that will use them to buy shares of privatizing companies, or 
even to use the vouchers to bid for shares directly. While the government is 
very sympathetic to the idea of having private mutual funds to collect or buy 
vouchers, it is resisting the idea of  Polish-style state-sponsored mutual funds, 
which might prove difficult to separate from the government in Russia. Details 
of this voucher scheme remain to be worked out, and it is likely to be intro- 
duced late in  1992. The government feels the urgency of at least announcing 
some future giveaway to the public to avoid resentment of privatization. 
12.4.7  Summary 
In this section, we have outlined some strategies of the Russian privatization 
program. These strategies invite the workers and the local governments to give 
up their control rights, allocating them to the managers and the new investors. 
But, even  if  all the  steps described  in this  section are taken, conflicts over 
privatization and restructuring will remain. Nonetheless, the legislation should 
continue to move in the direction of providing compensation for the stakehold- 
ers in return for cooperating in privatization. 
12.5  The Future of  Privatization 
With a high probability,  there will be very little privatization in Russia in 
the near future. Too many local governments, ministries, and even enterprise 
managers are opposed to privatization, and it is much easier to stop privatiza- 
tion than to  move it ahead. Nonetheless, in many regions, the pressure to privat- 
ize from below will be high enough that some privatization, particularly  of 
small firms, will take place. In this section, we discuss what will be the likely 
privatization scenarios. We consider small-scale privatization (meaning that of 
firms to be privatized by the local governments) and large-scale privatization 
(meaning that of firms to be privatized by the Russian government, separately). 
12.5.1  Small-Scale Privatization 
Some manufacturing firms, as well as many shops, bathhouses, and movie 
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although not necessarily to the highest bidder. It is virtually certain that the 
management and the employees of these firms will be substantially involved in 
these sales. In some cases, particularly of smaller or of unprofitable firms, the 
employees and the managers will get together and simply acquire the firm in 
an auction or a management buyout. They will subsequently try to find partners 
to help them with restructuring,  and perhaps even do it themselves. In fact, 
some auctions of shops have successfully taken place in Nizhny Novgorod in 
March 1992, with many more still to come. 
Prices paid in these transactions are likely to be very low. The starting values 
in the auctions and competitions are book values of assets, which because of 
fast depreciation and a rapid inflation are usually only a trivial fraction of firm 
values. Moreover, there will not be much competition for most of these assets. 
First, local governments are not required to conduct auctions and so will proba- 
bly use less transparent privatization techniques. If their efforts to restrict par- 
ticipation in auctions succeed, in many cases the local governments might sim- 
ply be able to decide the winners of the auctions themselves in exchange for 
bribes. Second, the managers and the workers will obviously strongly oppose 
competition for the assets if  an MBO is an option. If outsiders are involved, 
they will become partners of the MBO organizers rather than making compet- 
ing bids. With little competition  and low starting values, equilibrium prices 
will be low. The bureaucrats will get bribes to grease the wheels of this process 
and are therefore likely to go along. In this way, the local governments will give 
up control rights in exchange for payments to the bureaucrats, a nontransparent 
procedure but one that works.  Small-scale privatization will not raise much 
money. 
Some of the money for the worker-management  buyouts will undoubtedly 
come from the cash reserves of the firms, which typically are not accounted 
for completely in the calculations  of book value. The Russian law explicitly 
allows the use of these cash reserves for the purposes of buying firms from the 
state. In fact, many firms have been preparing for this strategy by accumulating 
cash reserves. In  addition,  if  the credit  policy  allows them  to do so, many 
MBOs will use bank loans to acquire the firms. The banks lending to these 
activities are likely to be the so-called private banks, which in fact take the 
deposits  from other state enterprises  and  lend  them  out, usually  for trade. 
Given the low prices in the worker-management  buyouts, these loans will in 
most cases be repaid in a few months. In the cases where the WMBO organiz- 
ers need additional funds, they will probably turn to some of the existing busi- 
nessmen to participate in the acquisitions. This strategy will be most prevalent 
in firms that can profitably  produce some goods for the local market or for 
export. For example, many of the stores in Moscow are attracting such invest- 
ments because their retail space can be used for selling imported consumer 
goods as well as whatever these stores have been selling traditionally. The firms 
that attract such outside money will restructure most rapidly and efficiently, in 
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necks. These WMBOs with the participation of outside money are most similar 
to the typical Western MBO. 
Very  few of  the smaller firms will be sold outright to buyers who are not 
insiders in the firms. A few auctions will be won by outsiders. Sometimes, 
outsiders will pay local bureaucrats higher bribes than the insiders do and will 
gain control in this way. These cases will be the exception rather than the rule 
since the built-in procedures strongly favor the insiders. Similarly, foreigners 
will rarely get involved in smaller firms, except through joint ventures with the 
insiders, since typically these firms are too small and too unlikely to export in 
the  short  run  to interest  them.  Overall,  small-scale  privatization  will  be a 
slightly more transparent and regularized version of the spontaneous privatiza- 
tion that has already begun in Russia. 
12.5.2  Large-Scale Privatization: Who Will Be the Buyers? 
Some of the intermediate and large enterprises in Russia are too large and 
have too much capital per worker, even at book value, to be privatized through 
worker-management buyouts. Even if  the sector ministries get their way  and 
the suppliers and customers are allowed to participate in the MBOs, the com- 
bined resources might still be insufficient to buy out the largest companies. 
Also, since the largest companies are being privatized  from the center, their 
privatization will require considerably more transparency to avoid bad public- 
ity. Transparency, of course, also raises prices as long as they are not pinned to 
book values. Nor will it be easy to conduct MBOs with the participation of 
local investors since again there is simply not enough private capital in Russia 
today to acquire more than a few of its large enterprises. The most likely alter- 
natives for small-scale privatization  are often not open for large-scale priva- 
tization. 
One potential hope for large privatization is foreign buyers. Unfortunately, 
the foreign buyers are interested in many natural resource industries in Russia, 
but not much else. Even when they are interested, they face several obstacles. 
First, current laws require the agreement of  too many people,  including the 
local government, GKI, the sectoral ministries, and the Committee on Foreign 
Investment, for an acquisition by a foreigner to take place. With so many ap- 
provals required, most proposals are likely to be rejected or sink in infinite 
negotiations, like VAZ. Second, Russia still lacks laws regulating business ac- 
tivity  in  general and  foreign investment  in particular.  Except  in  the sectors 
where foreigners can take stuff out of the ground fast and export it, the absence 
of laws will slow down foreign investment. Third, in many cases, the managers 
of the Russian companies are not eager to give up control to foreign investors. 
Since these investors will often insist on control, few actual privatizations  to 
foreigners might actually be accomplished. 
The difficulty of  finding buyers for large companies suggests that Russia 
will need to use its large-scale voucher privatization  scheme aggressively  to 
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will depend crucially on the technological feasibility of introducing vouchers 
as well as the possibility of running auctions in which both vouchers and cash 
can be used to bid (perhaps for different blocks of  shares). If these technologi- 
cal difficulties can be overcome, the voucher scheme will become the central 
element  of the Russian privatization. If  technological  problems become too 
severe, the government will move to a simpler method of allocating shares to 
the public, perhaps through state-sponsored intermediaries such as the mutual 
funds used in Poland. As of this writing, the details of the voucher scheme in 
Russia are too vague to be discussed more concretely. 
12.6  Conclusion 
In this paper, we described privatization as a redistribution of existing con- 
trol rights over company assets between its stakeholders. To get the stakehold- 
ers to agree to this redistribution,  they need to be compensated in terms of 
dividends and privatization proceeds. We have discussed some schemes of pro- 
viding this compensation to the workers, the managers, and the local govern- 
ments, the three principal forces that might oppose privatization. While these 
schemes will not stop all resistance to privatization, they might well reduce it. 
Luckily, the Russian privatization program in most instances tries to reconcile 
conflicts between stakeholders. 
It is impossible to tell how fast privatization will proceed in Russia. Many 
bureaucrats,  politicians,  and managers  oppose it  and have enough political 
clout to slow it down. Even after privatization, restructuring  need not come. 
Despite all these concerns, it is obviously essential to push for privatization 
and to grease the wheels when they turn slowly. 
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Comment  Jacek Rostowski 
The authors describe one of the key microeconomic problems of  the Russian 
economy: the failure of property  rights over the vast majority  of nonhuman 
assets to be properly defined. Instead of clearly defined owners there are stake- 
holders whose rights to decide what to do with assets are unclear. Moreover, 
there are no clear procedures about what to do if stakeholders disagree. As a 
result, by  Coase’s theorem, assets are used inefficiently. Therefore, privatiza- 
tion is seen above all as a way to define property rights.’ However, because 
privatization takes time, stakeholders are motivated to undertake  action that 
will increase their claims during the privatization process, even if these actions 
reduce the value of  the assets being contested. This is what I call property 
rights-seeking  behaviol: It is rational to pursue such behavior  as long as its 
costs-in  terms of the resulting value destruction that is borne by the stake- 
holder concerned-are  smaller than the expected benefits. 
Shleifer and Vishny believe that the Russian privatization program, which 
transforms managers and workers into (minority) shareholders and grants local 
authorities an important share of privatization proceeds, will work to neutralize 
the opposition of these key groups to privatization. Also, by providing an initial 
definition of property rights, the scheme is likely to reduce destructive property 
rights-seeking  behavior, as it is worth engaging in such behavior only if one’s 
expected increase in wealth (compared to the allocation imposed by the state), 
less the costs of achieving it, is positive. Without such an “external” definition, 
some stakeholders may get nothing if they fail to assert their claims through 
destructive action. Nevertheless, it remains the case that, if the allocation of 
property rights resulting from the Russian government’s privatization program 
is very different from that which corresponds to stakeholders’ perception of 
the allocation that would result from a period of property rights-seeking  be- 
havior, such behavior is still likely to take place. A key question is therefore 
how  close the proposed  Russian  allocation  is to such a “perceived equilib- 
rium” allocation? 
An alternative approach would be to find an “uncontestable”  allocation- 
one that, once made, could not be resisted  by  stakeholders,  even if it were 
not necessarily the same as the equilibrium allocation. Given the strength of 
egalitarian and “workerist” sentiments in Russia, I believe that such an alloca- 
tion would be one in which the bulk of the shares in most state-owned enter- 
prises (SOEs) was given to the employees.2 Such an allocation need not ex- 
1. Privatization could also be used to allocate assets to those who need to make ex ante invest- 
ments in the human capital that is complementary with these assets, along the lines of Grossman 
and Hart (1986).  Privatizers would thus attempt to achieve an allocation of property rights as close 
to the efficient as possible. However, the authors do not pursue this interesting strand in their 
analysis far. 
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clude the other stakeholders. Central and local governments could retain their 
stake in each enterprise in the form of shares that would be nonvoting as long 
as they  remained  in public hands  but that would recover their voting rights 
when  sold.’  Each  share sold by  employees  would  require the  simultaneous 
purchase of a proportionate number of public-sector  shares. Managers would 
obtain  shares as employees and also often  be able to use their prestige  and 
greater understanding of the business to convince workers to agree to manage- 
ment buyouts. 
This approach abolishes all ownership rights held by local and central gov- 
ernment at a stroke, giving these rights to a group that ought to be capable of 
defending  them  in practice.  It is far from clear that  the supervisory  boards 
of  commercialized  firms advocated by  the authors, which  would  consist of 
representatives of the State Property Agency (GKI), managers, workers’ repre- 
sentatives, and banks,  would have  the power  to resist  the  local authorities. 
Given the extremely dangerous propensity of  local governments in Russia to 
replace the old branch ministries  as the controllers  of  the activities of  state 
enterprises on their territory, such an “intraenterprise revolution” is vital. The 
experience of Eastern Europe suggests that the only force within the enterprise 
capable of standing up to the planning bureaucracy is the workers4 However, 
it is critical that the shares should become the property of employees as indi- 
viduals (and not as members of a collective) and that they should from the start 
be tradable (i.e., “closed” companies must be banned). 
A number of  advantages relating to privatization technique  stem from the 
approach that I am suggesting. First, the authorities are not obliged to organize 
auctions of enterprises (as is foreseen in the Russian program) but can leave 
the choice and organization of the privatization technique to the enterprise it- 
self. While auctions would continue to be possible, trade sales, flotations, and 
management buyouts could now also be used. Given the “administrative fragil- 
ity” of  the  Russian  state, this  is a not  inconsiderable  advantage.  More im- 
portant, under the Russian scheme, GKI has to decide on whether and how to 
break up the enterprise before privatization. It seems plausible that the manag- 
ers and workers in the enterprise  will  know  better how  to do this, and the 
“employee-centered” scheme gives them the incentive to do it relatively effi- 
ciently. 
Furthermore,  the profitability  of SOEs typically collapses after macroeco- 
nomic stabilization in post-Communist  economie~.~  Many loss-making enter- 
prises will be impossible to sell. Domestic and foreign capitalists will be will- 
ing to pay only very small amounts for marginally profitable enterprises, which 
may require a large injection of capital and a huge reorganization and restruc- 
3. To the best of my knowledge, the originator of  this proposal is Tomasz Stankicwicz of War- 
4.  If the workers decide to allow themselves to be led by the managers in determining the firm’s 
5. In Russia, it seems to have collapsed before stabilization. 
saw University, the deputy minister of privatization of Poland. 
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turing effort if they are to have a long-term future. Unlike in the auction-based 
scheme, employee-owners can help resolve this problem by increasing the cap- 
ital of the firm by  admitting outside capitalists. Sale to foreign investors be- 
comes far harder to oppose on nationalist grounds when  the  sellers are the 
workers rather than the government. The employee-centered approach also en- 
sures that, whatever the profitability of the firm, there always exists a group of 
owners whose future is bound up with the enterprise for at least a time. And, 
unlike worker-managed firms, employee-owners do not have the disincentive 
to invest that results from the knowledge that the enterprise will ultimately be 
privatized, with the proceeds going to the state. 
Last, but far from least, Polish experience since 1990 shows that, even in 
the almost complete  absence of divestment of  organized  businesses by  the 
state, one can have extremely dynamic private-sector  development as long as 
the commercial property market is decontrolled and SOEs have the right to 
sell their physical assets. Capitalists prefer to buy (or hire) the assets and work 
force they actually need and to combine them in ways that correspond to their 
requirements  rather than to take over organized businesses created in com- 
pletely different circumstances and adapt them. There is some concern that the 
Russian  auction-centered  approach  to privatization  will  make  it harder  for 
SOEs to sell their physical assets, as a result of a desire by the authorities to 
prevent insiders from stripping the assets of SOEs at the expense of the formal 
owner (the state). The employee-centered approach, like worker management 
in Poland, frees the enterprise to do as it sees fit with its assets.h 
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Discussion Summary 
Jan Svejnar argued that a lack of human capital would make it difficult to hire 
enough qualified board members to implement the corporatization proposal. 
Andrei Shleifer responded by noting that many of  the board members would 
come from the current group of managers. 
Simon Johnson discussed the role of managers in Ukraine. He said that the 
transfer of  control rights from ministries to managers has led to greater effi- 
ciency. He noted that, in Kiev, managers effectively control the local govern- 
6. Part of the proceeds of the sale would go to the state, in a proportion corresponding to its share 
in total ownership. This is a good reason for keeping the share of the state low on privatization via 
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ment and the workers by using side payments. He noted, however, that, while 
many managers have effective control of the firms they operate, they do not 
have the ability to sell those control rights legally. Finally, he predicted that the 
next step for Ukrainian managers will be to undertake leveraged management 
buyouts. 
Richurd Luyard suggested that the Russian government should undertake a 
mass privatization plan. He said that Shleifer and Vishny’s corporatization plan 
would  actually  create hurdles  for  the  privatization  process  since worker- 
controlled board members would prevent rapid restructuring. 
Michael Dooley suggested that in addition to the four groups that Shleifer 
and Vishny had identified-the  central government, local governments, work- 
ers, and managers-the  bureaucrats  in state-owned banks  would also try to 
grab control rights of  newly privatized firms. Dooley argued that the lack of a 
private capital market would enable the banks to make this demand. 
Dmitri Vasiliev also suggested that Shleifer and Vishny had ignored some 
important participants in the privatization debate. He highlighted the roles of 
the army and the new business class. 